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1. Introduction 
 
Replications are regarded as inevitable means of securing the reliability of scientific 
experiments. Despite this, most replications in cognitive metaphor research are not exact 
repetitions, but modified or refined versions of another experiment.  
Non-exact replications are often conducted in order to rule out possible systematic errors, 
or to test a more differentiated research hypothesis. If there is harmony between the results of 
the original experiment and its non-exact replication(s), then the results are mostly evaluated 
as reinforcing the original research hypothesis. If, however, the revised version of the original 
experiment is carried out by adherents of a rival theory, then the experimental data gained are 
usually found to conflict with the original results and prompt the rejection of the research 
hypothesis. This seems to lead to a paradox: 
 
(P) Replications are  
(a) effective tools of problem solving because they lead to more plausible 
experimental results; and they are also 
(b) ineffective tools of problem solving because they trigger cumulative contradictions 
among different replications of an experiment. 
 
This paper intends to propose a possible resolution to this paradox. It will present three case 
studies on replication attempts conducted within cognitive metaphor research. Section 2 will 
offer a first concise description of the original experiments and the replication attempts. In 
Section 3, a metascientific model will be presented with the help of which the relationship 
between original experiments and their repetitions can be described. In Section 4, this model 
will be applied to the replication attempts delineated in Section 2. On the basis of our 
findings, Section 5 will try to generalise the results and provide a solution to (P). 
 
 
2. Psycholinguistic experiments on metaphor processing and their replications 
2.1. Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg & Horton (2000) and its replications 
2.1.1. The original experiment: Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg & Horton (2000) 
 
Experiment 1: Experiment 1 was intended to test different predictions of Cognitive Metaphor 
Theory. Participants were presented with 4 kinds of scenarios: 
 
1. implicit-mapping scenario: contains conventionalised expressions supposed to belong to 
the same conceptual metaphor as the target expression (which was always the final 
sentence of the scenario);1 
                                                 
1  For example:  
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2. no-mapping scenario: conventional instantiations of the supposed mapping are replaced 
by expressions not related to the given mapping;2  
3. explicit-mapping scenario: in addition to the implicit-mapping scenario, the supposed 
mapping has been made explicit by being mentioned at the beginning of the text;3 
4.  literal-meaning scenario: renders the target expression as literal.4 
 
From Lakoff and Johnson’s theory it would follow that, first, the target sentences containing 
novel instantiations of the given metaphor family were readily accessible and easier to 
understand in the case of the implicit-mapping scenario than in the case of the no-mapping 
scenario; second, explicit mention of the mapping should further facilitate the creation of the 
given metaphorical mapping. To find out whether this is the case, reading times of the final 
sentences were measured and compared. Literal-meaning scenarios had a control function. 
The authors also applied totally irrelevant filler items, quiz questions, and practice scenarios.  
 
Experiment 2: Since the experimental data indicate that conventional metaphors are not 
capable of facilitating the comprehension of metaphorical expressions that belong to the same 
metaphorical mapping according to CMT, regardless of whether they are explicit or implicit, 
in Experiment 2, explicit mapping scenarios were changed for scenarios containing novel, 
non-conventional metaphorical expressions. The novel condition turned out to be significantly 
faster than the implicit or the no-mapping conditions. 
 
Experiment 3: The authors expressed the concern that fluency and conceptual homogeneity 
of the literal and novel-mapping scenarios may, in comparison to implicit-mapping and no-
mapping scenarios, give rise to semantic priming. This experiment tried to rule out this 
possible source of error. A target word in the last sentence of the novel-mapping contexts was 
selected on the basis of the votes of 8 participants; following this, another group of 
participants had to decide whether these words were English words after having read the text 
of different types of scenarios. Since there was no significant difference between the reaction 
times given in the scenarios in this lexical decision task, Keysar et al. concluded that there 
were no priming effects. 
 
2.1.2. Replication: Thibodeau & Durgin (2008) 
 
Experiment 1: Experiment 1 was an exact repetition of Experiment 2 in Keysar et al. (2000). 
Although the results showed a similar pattern, the authors did not draw the conclusion that the 
experiment is reliable, but did point out a possible systematic error source. Namely, they 
raised the concern that conventionality might have been confounded with the fit between 
contexts and targets, since novel scenarios were judged to have a better fit than conventional 
ones by participants. 
                                                                                                                                                        
As a scientist, Tina thinks of her theories as her contribution. She is a prolific researcher, conceiving an 
enormous number of new findings each year. Tina is currently weaning her latest child. 
2  For example:  
As a scientist, Tina thinks of her theories as her contribution. She is a dedicated researcher, initiating an 
enormous number of new findings each year. Tina is currently weaning her latest child. 
3  For example:  
As a scientist, Tina thinks of her theories as her children. She is a prolific researcher, conceiving an enormous 
number of new findings each year. Tina is currently weaning her latest child. 
4  For example:  
As a scientist, Tina thinks of her theories as children. She makes certain that she nurtures them all. But she does 
not neglect her real children. She monitors their development carefully. Tina is currently weaning her latest 
child. 
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Experiment 2: After a thorough analysis and criticism of Keysar et al.’s (2000) Experiment 
2, Thibodeau and Durgin conducted the same experiment by making use of new, improved 
stimulus materials. In this case, the results were inconsistent with the earlier findings: there 
was no significant difference between novel, conventional and literal scenarios. 
 
Experiment 3: In a reading times experiment, there were 3 types of scenarios. In the related 
metaphor scenarios, the target sentence contained a novel metaphor instantiating the same 
metaphor family as the conventional metaphors in the previous text. In the unrelated metaphor 
scenarios, the target sentence and the previous text made use of different metaphor families. 
Non-metaphor scenarios used literal sentences. The authors found that in the related metaphor 
scenarios, the final sentence read significantly faster than the final sentences of the unrelated 
scenarios, or in the non-metaphor scenarios. This also means that the experiments resulted in 
a shift in the judgement concerning what data should be regarded as relevant: instead of 
novelty/conventionality, the key factor seemed to be matchedness/unmatchedness. 
 
2.1.3. Commentary 
 
The most interesting point is, of course, the evaluation of the exact replication attempt by 
Thibodeau and Durgin. Instead of interpreting the similar results as a sign of reliability, they 
rejected the original experiment as an unusable data source and conducted non-exact 
replications which produced contradictory results. Thus, the positive outcome of an exact 
replication did not lead to a higher degree of plausibility but to the emergence of 
inconsistencies.  
 
 
2.2. Glucksberg, McGlone & Manfredi’s (1997) experiment and its replications 
2.2.1. The original experiment: Glucksberg et al. (1997), Experiment 1 
 
The authors intended to provide empirical evidence for the claim that metaphors are, in 
harmony with the Attributive Categorisation View, nonreversible. The stimulus material 
consisted of 24 metaphors, their corresponding similes and 12 literal similarity statements, 
each of them in original-order, in noun-reversed and noun-phrase reversed versions. 5 
Participants had to evaluate the meaningfulness of the sentences on a 0-7 scale,6 and, in the 
case of ratings 1-7, they were asked to write a paraphrase of the sentence as well. The 
paraphrases were analysed by two independent judges. The authors found that both reversed 
metaphors and metaphoric comparisons obtained significantly lower meaningfulness ratings 
than their original counterparts, while with literal comparisons, there was no such difference. 
Only a few reversed metaphoric statements were equivalent in meaning with the original-
order statement; most reversed metaphoric statements were explicitly or implicitly re-
reversed, and some were interpreted with new grounds. 
 
2.2.2. First replication: Chiappe, Kennedy & Smykowsky (2003), Experiment 1 
 
The first modification to Glucksberg et al’s (1997) first experiment pertains to the stimulus 
material: the set of the target metaphors and similes was extended from 24 to 52, and literal 
similes were omitted. The authors also modified the research hypothesis as follows: (a) if the 
                                                 
5  For example: Original-order metaphor: my marriage was an icebox; noun-reversed: my icebox was a 
marriage; noun-phrase-reversed: an icebox was my marriage. 
6  0 = makes no sense; 7 = makes perfect sense. 
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traditional comparison theory of metaphors holds, then metaphors are converted into similes 
and interpreted as comparisons; thus, reversing topics and vehicles should decrease the 
comprehensibility of metaphors and similes to a slight but equal degree; (b) if Glucksberg’s 
ACV is correct, then non-literal similes are interpreted, similarly to metaphors, as category 
statements; thus, both metaphors and similes should be irreversible; (c) if the authors’ 
“distinct statements” view holds, then metaphors function like category claims and similes 
like similarity claims; thus, reversal should affect metaphors more strongly than similes. The 
analysis of the paraphrases was conducted in two steps. First, a judge examined the original 
order items and identified the most frequent interpretations. As the second step, the reversed 
order paraphrases were classified by two further judges in such a way that they compared the 
reversals to the most frequent original versions, without knowing whether they were 
presented as metaphors or similes. In contrast to Glucksberg et al., who found that both 
metaphors and (metaphorical) similes received significantly lower values when reversed, 
Chiappe et al. came to the conclusion that reversion affected metaphors to a greater extent 
than similes. The results of the paraphrase analyses were considerably different from the 
earlier findings, too. Namely, reversed similes were accepted to a greater extent than 
metaphors, and most reversed items (metaphors and similes alike) were equivalent in meaning 
to their original counterparts. Further, re-reversal was more frequently applied for metaphors 
than for similes. 
 
2.2.3. Second replication: Campbell & Katz (2006) 
 
In Experiment 1, the authors applied the same stimulus material, tasks and scoring scheme 
as in Glucksberg et al.’s (1997) Experiment 1. In addition, in two booklets of four, items were 
presented not in isolation but in a discourse context. These contexts were written so as to 
invite use of the salient characteristics of the vehicle to interpret the metaphor, as identified by 
the two authors on the basis of the canonical order of the given metaphor. The coding of the 
received paraphrases (the identification of the ground of participants’ interpretations) was 
initiated with the help of codes stipulated by the two authors, but the list of the grounds of 
metaphors was extended by items found in the paraphrases which were different from the 
grounds previously determined by the authors. One of the scorers was blind to the aim of the 
experiment. The results differed substantially from those obtained in Glucksberg et al. (1997) 
and by Chiappe et al. (2003) alike, and there were big differences between the versions with 
context and without context as well.  
 
Experiment 2 aimed to test the hypothesis of Glucksberg’s ACV which states that metaphors 
are irreversible with the help of the same stimulus material but using a different method. 
From this hypothesis the prediction was made that when topic and vehicle are reversed, there 
should be great problems finding an appropriate interpretation, and, as a consequence, reading 
times should be slower. The stimulus material consisted of the same 24 metaphors used in 
context in the previous experiment and filler passages. The items were presented in a one-
word-at-a-time self-paced moving windows format. Reading latencies for each word were 
recorded. In the statistical analyses, reading times over five regions with canonical and with 
reversed order were compared: for the word before the metaphor, for the NP-topic, for the 
verb, for the NP-vehicle and for the word following the metaphor. Since no significant 
differences were found between the values of canonical and reversed metaphors, the authors 
came to the conclusion that this experiment does not provide support for Glucksberg’s ACV. 
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2.2.4. Commentary 
 
Although none of the replication attempts was an exact repetition of the original experiment, 
the results, and especially, the diversity of the values gained, is really perplexing. Neither the 
extension of the stimulus material, nor the addition of a second type of stimuli (target 
sentences in a discourse context), nor the methodological changes should lead to such huge 
differences. However, criteria on the basis of which one could decide which version of the 
experiment should be accepted, are missing. 
 
 
2.3. Bowdle & Gentner (2005) and its replications 
2.3.1. The original experiment: Bowdle & Gentner (2005) 
Experiment 1: Participants had to indicate on a 10-point scale whether a certain idiom 
sounds more natural or sensible in metaphor form or in simile form. On the basis of pre-tests, 
the stimulus material consisted of 64 items: 32 figurative statements in both the comparison 
(simile) form and the categorization (metaphor) form,7 16 literal comparison statements8 and 
16 literal categorization statements.9 Half of the figuratives were conventional, the other half 
were novel; similarly, the figuratives were either abstract or concrete. According to Gentner’s 
career of metaphor hypothesis, novel metaphors are processed as comparisons, while 
conventionality results in a shift to another mode of processing, namely, categorisation. The 
experimental data were found to be in harmony with the predictions of the career of metaphor 
hypothesis, as conventional figurative statements were more acceptable in categorization form 
than novel figuratives. No main effect of concreteness was found, but there was an 
unpredicted interaction between concreteness and conventionality. 
 
Experiment 2: In order to find out whether the grammatical form preferences mirror 
processing differences, the online version of Experiment 1 was conducted. That is, the same 
stimulus material was applied but each sentence was seen in only one form. The 32 
participants read the prime sentences on the computer screen, and had to press a key when 
they understood the sentence and type in an interpretation of the statement. Response time 
was measured from the appearance of the sentence until the first key press. Moreover, aptness 
ratings were collected from 32 further participants with the help of a 10-point scale. The 
results corresponded to the predictions. First, conventional items were quicker than novel 
items, independently of whether they were presented as metaphors or similes. Second, novel 
similes were quicker than novel metaphors, and conventional metaphors were quicker than 
conventional similes – that is, processing times were found to be shorter whenever the 
processing mode according to the career of metaphor theory and grammatical form were in 
harmony. Furthermore, post hoc tests yielded the result that conventionality is a decisive 
factor in the choice of simile/metaphor form, while aptness is not. 
 
Experiment 3: Experiments 1 and 2 do not touch upon the claim of Gentner’s career of 
metaphor hypothesis that the shift in the processing mode of metaphors occurs gradually, as a 
by-product of the repetitions of the comparison process. That is, during the repeated 
derivation or activation of the same abstract, domain-general meaning of the vehicle term, this 
meaning becomes lexicalised and added as a secondary sense to the vehicle term. To test this 
part of Gentner’s theory, the authors developed a two-stage experimental design. In the first, 
                                                 
7  For example: Friendship is like a wine vs. Friendship is a wine. 
8  For example: An encyclopedia is like a dictionary. 
9  For example: Pepper is a spice. 
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study stage, participants saw pairs of novel similes using the same base term and they had to 
fill in a target term in a third example of the same structure.10 The authors’ hypothesis was 
that this kind of priming “would promote conventionalization of the novel base terms”. In this 
way, the authors aimed to “speed up the process of conventionalization from years to 
minutes” (Bowdle & Gentner 2005: 206). The material also involved similar tasks with literal 
comparisons. In the second, test stage, subjects received a list of novel and conventional 
figuratives and had to decide whether they prefer them in simile (comparison) or metaphor 
(categorisation) form with the help of a 10-point scale. The base term of some figuratives was 
presented in the novel similes from the study stage, while others were borrowed from the 
literal comparisons; a third group of base terms was not present in the materials of the study 
stage. The prediction was that conventional figuratives should be clearly preferred in 
metaphor form and, accordingly, receive the highest values, while the occurrence of the base 
term in novel similes in the study phase should lead to significantly higher preference 
numbers than in the case of figuratives with no prior exposure, but the same should not hold 
with items in which the prime had been seen in literal comparisons. The experimental data 
corresponded to these predictions. 
 
2.3.2. Replication: Jones & Estes (2006) 
 
Experiment 1: The participants’ task was to indicate on a 7-point scale whether they prefer a 
certain idiom in metaphor form or in simile form. On the basis of pre-tests, the stimulus 
material consisted of 64 pairs of high and low apt statements; 32 of these sentences had a 
conventional vehicle, while 32 had a novel vehicle. According to the authors, Gentner’s SMT 
yields the prediction that the metaphor form should be preferred with conventional vehicles, 
and the simile form should be chosen with novel vehicles. In contrast, on the basis of 
Glucksberg’s ACV, aptness should be the decisive factor. The experimental data provide 
evidence against Gentner’s SMT, because categorical preference was lower with conventional 
vehicles than with novel items. In contrast, the data support Gluckberg’s ACV, because 
metaphor form preference was higher with more apt items, although aptness was only 
marginally significant in the item analysis. 
 
Experiment 2: This experiment was a replication of Experiment 2 by Bowdle & Gentner 
(2005), with two modifications. The authors applied the same stimulus material as in the 
previous experiment. Participants were asked to read figurative statements (either in metaphor 
or in simile form) on the screen and press the spacebar when they had an interpretation ready. 
The authors also added a second task: after typing in the interpretation in a textbox, 
participants had to rate on a 7-point scale the ease of the thinking which led to that 
interpretation. The length of the sentences was taken into consideration by the statistical 
analysis. The results were completely different from Bowdle & Gentner’s findings: Jones & 
Estes found a significant main effect of aptness both in the comprehension times and in the 
easiness ratings. 
 
Experiment 3: Since this experiment makes use of the same stimulus material, but used a 
different method from the previous two experiments by Jones and Estes, it cannot be regarded 
as a refined version of the original experiment by Bowdle and Gentner, or of Experiments 1 
and 2. 
                                                 
10  For example: 
An acrobat is like a butterfly. 
A figure skater is like a butterfly. 
_____________ is like a butterfly. 
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2.3.3. Commentary 
 
We are faced with a situation where pairs of experiments lead to conflicting results. That is, 
on the basis of three experiments which rely on the same stimulus material but apply different 
methods of data production, we obtain results that are in harmony with each other – but in 
conflict with two further experiments replicating the first two experiments. Therefore, the 
second (and further) experiment(s) by the researcher who conducted the original experiment 
increases the original experiment’s plausibility by applying a different method, but the 
replications of a rival researcher decrease it.  
 
 
3. Metatheoretical background 
3.1. Experimental complexes 
Contemporary philosophy of science rejects the idea of providing general, uniform norms for 
scientific theorising such as verifiability, falsifiability, etc. Instead, only tentative hypotheses 
with more or less restricted scope are formulated by philosophers of science on the basis of 
detailed case studies focusing on different aspects of research practice in special fields of 
scientific inquiry and from diverse historical periods.11 This approach fits into this tendency. 
Its main motivation was to grasp a specific characteristic of psycholinguistic experiments. 
Namely, in this research field, most papers publishing experimental results involve – in 
contrast to other branches of science such as physics, medicine, or chemistry – not only one 
experiment but 3-4 similar experiments, the relationship of which, however, is not clear. They 
are usually not complementary but rather seem to be improved versions of one another. 
Despite this, their results are often interpreted in such a way that they reinforce each other, 
and provide converging evidence. If they were regarded in fact as improved versions of each 
other, then only the last member of such a chain of experiments should be taken into account 
and made public.  
In order to grasp the relationship between (non)-exact replications and original 
experiments, we have to transgress the boundaries of single experiments and identify more 
complex structures. This motivates the elaboration of the concept of ‘experimental 
complex’:12 
                                                 
11  “In the late 1950s, philosophers too began to pay more attention to actual episodes in science, and began to 
use actual historical and contemporary case studies as data for their philosophizing. Often, they used these 
cases to point to flaws in the idealized positivistic models. These models, they said, did not capture the real 
nature of science, in its ever-changing complexity. The observation language, they argued, could not be 
meaningfully independent of the theoretical language since the terms of the observation language were 
taken from the scientific theory they were used to test. All observation was theory-laden. Yet, again, trying 
to model all scientific theories as axiomatic systems was not a worthwhile goal. Obviously, scientific 
theories, even in physics, did their job of explaining long before these axiomatizations existed. In fact, 
classical mechanics was not axiomatized until 1949, but surely it was a viable theory for centuries before 
that. Further, it was not clear that explanation relied on deduction, or even on statistical inductive 
inferences. […] All the major theses of positivism came under critical attack. But the story was always the 
same – science was much more complex than the sketches drawn by the positivists, and so the concepts of 
science – explanation, confirmation, discovery – were equally complex and needed to be rethought in ways 
that did justice to real science, both historical and contemporary. Philosophers of science began to borrow 
much from, or to practice themselves, the history of science in order to gain an understanding of science 
and to try to show the different forms of explanation that occurred in different time periods and in different 
disciplines. Debates began to spring up about the theory ladeness of observation, about the continuity of 
scientific change, about shifts in meaning of key scientific concepts, and about the changing nature of 
scientific method. These were both fed by and fed into philosophically new areas of interest, areas that had 
existed before but which had been little attended to by philosophers.” (Machamer 2002: 6f.) 
12  For a more detailed elaboration of this concept, see Rákosi (manuscript). 
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(D1) An experimental complex consists of chains of closely related experiments which re-
evaluate some part of the original experiment such as its reliability, experimental 
design, research hypothesis, applied methods, statistical tools, etc.  
 
Each member of the experimental complex also re-evaluates the plausibility (acceptability) of 
the results obtained in the original experiment, and makes them more plausible, less plausible 
or shows them to be implausible.13  Such experimental complexes are considerably more 
complex than single experiments, because they may involve, among other things, 
 
– modified (improved) versions of the original experiment, 
– exact replications of the original experiment or one of its non-exact replications, 
– control experiments intended to rule out possible systematic errors in the original 
experiment or in one of its modifications, 
– counter-experiments, which make the most radical revision to the original experiment by 
applying a different method (experimental paradigm) to the same stimulus material in 
order to provide evidence against the research hypothesis at issue,  
– a wider set of perceptual and experimental data,   
– diverse perspectives by adherents of different theories,  
– different versions of the research hypothesis, but also 
– conflicts emerging from different evaluations of the outcome of the original experiment, 
– different kinds of problems, as well as attempted solutions; 
– a process of plausible argumentation that re-evaluates the earlier experimental results in 
the light of the newer experiments in the experimental complex and tries to resolve the 
inconsistencies between them.14 
 
Experimental complexes have a basically cyclic structure. See Figure 1.15 
 
thought experiment: 
analysis of the 
original/previous 
experiment 
 
re-evaluation of the 
original/previous 
experiment 
 
conduct of an 
exact replication  
     
 
 
plausible 
argumentation 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
comparison of the results 
and re-evaluation of the 
plausibility of the 
experimental data 
 conduct of a non-exact 
replication/control/counter 
experiment  
 
 
modification of the 
experimental 
design/elaboration 
of a control 
experiment 
 
                                                 
13  The notion of ‘plausibility’ is the central concept of the p-model of linguistic theorising and argumentation 
as presented in Kertész & Rákosi (2012, 2014) and applied to diverse fields of linguistic research. 
14  For a more thorough analysis of the argumentative aspects of psycholinguistic experiments, see Rákosi 
(2012, 2014), Kertész & Rákosi (2012). 
15  Simple and dotted arrows indicate successive (alternative) stages of the re-evaluation process; dashed 
arrows signify the argumentation process which organises the re-evaluation process. 
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Figure 1. The structure of experimental complexes 
 
The aim of these cyclic re-evaluations is the elaboration of an experiment that is, at least 
temporarily, stable and generally accepted by the members of the given research field: 
 
(D2) An experiment is a limit of an experimental complex, if  
(a) it evolved from the original experiment through a series of non-exact 
replications (that is, it results from the gradual modifications of the original 
experiment), 
(b) it has at least one successful exact replication (that is, it is reliable), and  
(c) it does not contain unsolved problems, so that the elaboration of further non-
exact replications seems to be unmotivated (that is, it can be regarded as valid in 
the given informational state). 
 
If an experimental complex has one limit, then it is called convergent. It is always the limit 
that provides the most plausible experimental data within the given experimental complex, 
because limits are free of known problems and are also reliable. Nevertheless, we should not 
forget that convergence is mostly only a temporary characteristic of experimental complexes, 
and it is always relative to a certain informational state and research community. That is, an 
experimental complex can arrive at a limit and come to a stop only pro tem and not 
permanently.16 
                                                 
16  This problem is closely related to a well-known issue pertaining to the evaluation of experiments in 
science. Namely, most adherents of current philosophy of science share the view that there are no general criteria 
that would incontestably decide on the acceptability of the outcome of an experiment. Collins (1985: 84) calls 
this problem the experimenter’s regress. That is, in order to ensure that a scientific experiment’s outcome is 
correct, one has to check whether all instruments functioned perfectly and the measurements were correct. For 
this end, however, further instruments, measurements and the investigation of the theoretical background of their 
application are needed, and so on. The experimenter’s regress is mostly broken by referring to socially accepted 
norms. As Kuhn has pointed out, explicit or even only implicitly accepted but in praxis often applied 
methodological norms determine to a considerable extent what happens in “normal science”: paradigms guide 
the research by prescribing, among other things, how to validate perceptual data. This strategy has, of course, not 
only advantages but also risks because it may lead to circularity:  
 
“Scientific communities tend to reject data that conflict with group commitments and, obversely, to adjust 
their experimental techniques to tune in on phenomena consistent with those commitments.” (Pickering 
1981: 236) 
 
To reduce this danger, Franklin (2002: 3ff., 2009) proposes a series of strategies such as experimental checks 
and calibration, in which the experimental apparatus reproduces known phenomena, or elimination of plausible 
sources of error and alternative explanations of the result (the Sherlock Holmes strategy), etc. Nevertheless, as 
he remarks, “[n]o single one of them, or fixed combination of them, guarantees the validity of an experimental 
result”. This also means that the acceptance of experimental results unavoidably contains subjective elements as 
well, since the comprehensiveness of the validating process of the results cannot be achieved. At certain points, 
one has to make decisions that remain necessarily arbitrary to some extent: 
 
“Of course, the application of these methods is not algorithmic. They require judgment and thus leave room 
for disagreement.” (Arabatzis 2008: 164) 
 
Despite this, it is vital to reduce the arbitrariness of the evaluations as much as possible. The most important 
method for this is the application of generally accepted criteria, and, most importantly, the publication and 
discussion of such analyses by the research community. Of course, the criteria proposed by Kaiser (2013: 139, 
141, 143), Haberlandt (1994: 9, 18), Hasson & Giora (2007: 305, 311, 316), and Keenan et al. (1990: 384), for 
instance, do not make it possible to make a completely objective and final decision about experiments in 
cognitive linguistics, either. Nonetheless, their use can lead to a well-founded re-evaluation of the results, which 
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These considerations provide ample support for (P)(a). Specifically, a limit of an 
experimental complex can be reached or at least approached with the help of increasingly 
elaborated non-exact replications of the original experiment. The effectiveness of this process 
may result from the requirement that every non-exact replication has to solve at least one 
unsolved problem of the original experiment or the previous members of the chain of 
experiments. That is, non-exact replications have to be progressive: 
 
(D3) A non-exact replication is progressive if it eliminates at least one systematic error or 
other problem of its predecessors and/or refines the research hypothesis by taking into 
consideration more relevant factors. If a non-exact replication is not progressive, then 
it is stagnating. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not the case that every progressive replication produces more plausible 
experimental data. The reason for this lies in the circumstance that any modification may not 
only rule out possible (systematic) errors but can also lead to the emergence of new ones, 
which, in addition, may be more serious than the resolved problem was, or may even turn out 
to be fatal. Thus, a progressive replication may solve a problem but also induce a dead end at 
the same time. Moreover, it is not always the case that non-exact replications provide 
increasingly similar results in the long run: quite often the opposite of this happens and the 
conflicts deepen and/or multiply. Therefore, the second part of (P)(b), that is, the statement 
that non-exact replications trigger cumulative contradictions between non-exact replications, 
seems to be correct, too. From this, however, it would be premature to conclude that 
replications are ineffective tools of problem solving. The point is that effectiveness – in 
contrast to progressivity – can be judged only in the long run. This means that we need a 
methodological tool which makes it possible to describe and evaluate different strategies of 
inconsistency resolution.  
 
 
3.2. Strategies of inconsistency resolution 
 
The above definition of experimental complexes does not exclude cases in which within an 
experimental complex, two chains of non-exact replications (or non-exact replications and 
counter-experiments) lead to conflicting results. These contradictions cannot be resolved 
simply by a mechanical comparison of the plausibility value of the results of the last member 
of the chains of experiments. Most frequently, it is not the current state of the cyclic process 
of re-evaluation that is decisive but the assessment of future prospects.  
Therefore, the first thing to do is to reconstruct the structure of the experimental complex, 
that is, to identify the limit-candidates as well as the chains of non-exact replications, control- 
and counter-experiments which produce them. The second step consists of re-evaluating the 
problem solving process within the chains of experiments, and comparing them. If the 
inconsistencies cannot be resolved on the basis of the information at hand, then the third step 
should be the determination of the directions of the continuation of the cyclic process of re-
evaluation. Basically, two strategies are possible in such situations.  
The first strategy consists of a separate continuation of the chains of experiments by 
conducting further non-exact replications, counter- or control experiments, comparing the 
results and taking a decision. An analogue of this method was called the “contrastive 
strategy” in Kertész & Rákosi (2012). There are three basic situations:  
                                                                                                                                                        
might be acceptable to most members of the research community temporarily, on the basis of our recent 
knowledge regarding metaphor processing. New developments, however, may overrule them in future. 
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– If the elaboration of further non-exact replications of one of the chains terminates and 
leads to a limit of the experimental complex in the sense of (D2), while the other chain 
comes to a dead-end, then the conflict can be resolved in such a way that the limit is kept, 
while the rival chain is rejected. Clearly, the elaboration of the first chain of experiments 
was an effective problem solving process, while the second one was ineffective.  
– If no limit can be achieved by continuing all chains, then the experimental complex is not 
capable of reaching a limit and the problem solving process is ineffective. 
– It may also occur that both chains of experiments evolving from the same original 
experiment lead to a limit. In such cases, it would not be reasonable to give up either of 
them. Thus, this inconsistency has to be (at least temporarily, in the given informational 
state) tolerated by the application of the second strategy. 
 
A second strategy is based on the elaboration and conduct of further experiments involving a 
refinement of the research hypothesis and experimental design in such a way that all factors 
found relevant so far are taken into consideration. The analogue of this method was called 
the “combinative strategy” in Kertész & Rákosi (2012). This method may make it possible to 
resolve contradictions between experiments conducted by researchers committed to rival 
approaches by integrating their results with the help of paraconsistent logic. 
In the next section, we will apply this model to the experiments briefly presented in 
Section 2.  
 
 
4. Reconstruction of the experimental complexes and evaluation of the problem 
solving process 
4.1. The experimental complex evolving from Keysar et al. (2000)  
4.1.1. The structure of the experimental complex 
 
The experimental complex evolving from Experiment 1 in Keysar et al. (2000) involves one 
exact and three non-exact replications, and a control experiment. See Figure 2.17 
 
OE (K2000/1)  NR1(K2000/2) CON(K2000/3) 
 
 
 
ER(T&D2008/1)  NR2(T&D2008/2) NR3(T&D2008/3) 
 
Figure 2. The structure of the experimental complex evolving from Keysar et al. (2000) 
 
Two chains of experiments can be identified: 
– NR1 is an improved version of the original experiment, while CON is a related control 
experiment; 
– ER is an exact replication of NR1, while NR2 and NR3 are non-exact replications of ER, 
leading to a conflicting result. 
 
There are two limit-candidates: NR1 (Section 2.1.1), and NR3 (Section 2.1.2). Thus, we have 
to reconstruct and re-evaluate two chains of experiments. 
                                                 
17  Simple arrows lead from experiments to their non-exact replications when these are regarded as 
improved versions of the former. Double arrows indicate that a non-exact replication produced a conflicting 
result. Dotted arrows signify the relationship between experiments and control experiments. Dashed arrows are 
used between experiments and counter-experiments. 
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4.1.2. Re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg & Horton 
(2000)  
 
OE (cf. Section 2.1.1): The first task is the identification of the problematic points of the 
original experiment:18 
 
Problem 1: The stimulus material is missing in the experimental report. Therefore, its 
correctness cannot be checked. 
Problem 2: The analysis of the excerpts of the texts presented in Keysar et al. (2000: 582) 
and in Thibodeau & Durgin (2008: 525) indicate that metaphorical expressions 
in the text of the scenarios and in the related target sentence cannot be always 
regarded as instantiations of the same conceptual metaphor in the sense of 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980).  
Problem 3: The stimulus material contained solely conventional metaphors. This clearly 
reduces the generality of the investigations.  
Problem 4: Explicit-mapping scenarios start with an explicit mention of the alleged 
conceptual metaphor. This may have eased the comprehension of the target 
expression in contrast to no-mapping or implicit-mapping scenarios due to a 
semantic priming effect.  
 
 
NR1 (cf. Section 2.1.1): Experiment 2 in Keysar et al. is a progressive non-exact replication 
because it deals with Problem 3 insofar as it extends the stimulus material with novel 
metaphors. Nevertheless, it leaves Problems 1, 2 and 4 open, and leads to the emergence of 
some new problems, too: 
 
Problem 5: The text of novel-mapping scenarios is (at least in some cases) more fluent, 
securing a better fit between the text of the scenario and the target sentence, than 
that of the implicit-mapping contexts.  
Problem 6: The authentication of the perceptual data is controversial because there is a huge 
difference between the mean reading times of implicit-mapping scenarios in the 
two experiments, while with no-mapping scenarios, the difference is rather 
insignificant, and in the literal-mapping condition, the values are almost 
identical. 
Problem 7: Novel-mapping scenarios start – similarly to explicit-mapping ones – with an 
explicit mention of the alleged conceptual metaphor. This may have eased the 
comprehension of the target expression in contrast to no-mapping or implicit-
mapping scenarios due to a semantic priming effect.  
Problem 8: The conceptual homogeneity of novel-mapping scenarios in comparison to 
implicit-mapping and no-mapping scenarios might have led to semantic priming.  
 
CON (cf. Section 2.1.1): Experiment 3 is a control experiment aimed at providing a solution 
to Problem 8, whose efficiency, however, can be questioned: 
 
Problem 9: At least in the excerpts presented in the experimental report, the target words 
were semantically clearly less related to the text of the scenario than other 
expressions of the target sentence. For example, in the case of the “ideas are 
                                                 
18 See also Rákosi (2012, Part IV). 
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people” scenario, the target word was “weaning”, while the target sentence also 
contained the word “child”, which was semantically related to “fertile”, “giving 
birth”.  
 
Table 1 summarises the current state of the re-evaluation process.19 
 
 P1 P2 P3 P4/P7 P5 P6 P8 P9 
OE E E E E     
NR1 O O P O E E E  
CON    O   O E 
 
Table 1. Overview of the re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Keysar et al. (2000) 
 
4.1.3. Re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Thibodeau & Durgin (2008) 
 
ER (cf. Section 2.1.2): The exact replication of NR1 leads to a similar pattern of results. Of 
course, Problems 1-8 emerge here, too. 
 
NR2 (cf. Section 2.1.2): Experiment 2 by Thibodeau and Durgin can be considered a 
progressive non-exact repetition because it provides a solution to Problems 1-5, and 7. 
Despite this, the results seem to be burdened by the following systematic errors: 
 
Problem 10: Problem 8 has become even more severe than it was with Keysar et al.’s (2000) 
experiments. 20  That is, there were semantically related words in the target 
sentences and the texts of the scenarios with the novel metaphor, the 
conventional metaphor and the literal target scenarios, while this was not the 
case with the non-metaphoric scenarios.21 
Problem 11: The filler scenarios were chosen on the basis of other considerations than was 
the case with the original experiment. Namely, Keysar et al’s main motivation 
was to make sure that “participants would not anticipate or notice a particular 
pattern” (Keysar et al. 2000: 583), and in this spirit, their fillers contained 
neither metaphorical final sentences nor metaphors belonging to the same 
conceptual domains. With the new version by Thibodeau & Durgin, however, 2 
in every 3 filler scenarios did contain metaphorical expressions; moreover, the 
fillers were intended to “avoid reading strategies that would cause people to 
skim over metaphors” (Thibodeau & Durgin 2008: 523). Thus, 4 of 10 questions 
following the fillers asked explicitly about metaphors. Therefore, participants 
might have discovered relatively easily that the experiment focused on the use of 
metaphorical expressions.  
Problem 12: As the authors diagnosed, the similar reading speed of the target sentences in the 
novel and conventional scenarios might be due to the circumstance that 
                                                 
19  In Tables 1-4, ’E’ indicates that a problem has emerged, ‘S’ means that a solution has been put forward 
to the problem at issue, ‘P’ stands for cases when a partial solution has been offered for a problem, while ‘O’ 
signifies that the problem remains open. 
20  For a more detailed analysis, see Rákosi (2012). 
21  For example: 
IDEAS ARE FOOD 
Target sentence: Otherwise, they give him indigestion. 
Novel: David has a hard time ingesting new ideas. He has to gnaw on them for days. 
Conventional: David has a hard time swallowing new ideas. He has to stew them over for days. 
Non-metaphor: David takes a while to fully understand new ideas. He has to think about them for days. 
Literal-reading: David has weak stomach. He has to take his time when eating meals. 
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participants expected a metaphorical sentence after a text which also contained 
metaphors – independently of whether or not these metaphors belong to the 
same metaphorical mapping. 
 
NR3 (cf. Section 2.1.2): Experiment 3 aimed to solve Problem 12 and make it possible to 
reject an alternative explanation of the results. The practice and filler tasks were modified, 
too, so that they no longer asked about metaphors explicitly. Thus, NE3 is a progressive non-
exact replication. It is, however, not a limit, because a variant of Problem 10 emerges again: 
 
Problem 13: It cannot be ruled out that the significantly shorter reading time of the consistent 
metaphorical scenarios was the result of semantic (lexical) priming.22 
 
Table 2 shows the reconstruction of this chain of experiments. 
 
 P1 P2 P3 P4/P7 P5 P6 P8/P10/P13 P11 P12 
OE E E E E      
NR1 O O P O E E E   
NR2 S S S S S  O E E 
NR3 S S S S S  O S S 
 
Table 2. Overview of the re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Thibodeau & Durgin (2008) 
 
4.1.4. Comparison of the problem solving processes 
 
On the basis of our reconstruction, the decision of Thibodeau and Durgin regarding the 
rejection of NR1 despite the successful exact replication, has become completely reasonable. 
Namely, both NR1 and ER are burdened with problems which could not be eliminated. 
Therefore, NR1 cannot be regarded as the limit of this experimental complex. Our analyses 
motivate a similar verdict with the limit-candidate NR3. From this it follows that the conflict 
between Keysar et al’s and Thibodeau and Durgin’s results cannot be resolved on the basis of 
the information at our disposal at this point of the process of re-evaluation. Although 
Thibodeau and Durgin’s results are more plausible, it would be erroneous to terminate the 
problem solving process at this point. Moreover, there are experiments by Gentner and her 
colleagues (see, above all, Gentner & Boronat 1992) whose results are in harmony with 
Keysar et al’s findings. 
 
4.1.5. Determination of the direction of the continuation of the cyclic process of re-
evaluation 
 
The next question is, of course, how the problem solving process should proceed. Since there 
were two factors (conventionality, matchedness) which seemed to be relevant, the first choice 
could be the application of the Combinative Strategy insofar as an experimental design should 
be elaborated that takes both of them into account and helps us to compare their contribution 
to metaphor processing. The persistent emergence of semantic priming effects, however, 
seriously questions the viability of this endeavour. 
                                                 
22
  Cf. “When David hears new ideas, he takes his time digesting them completely. He likes to chew them 
over slowly. 
Related target sentence: They are exquisite gourmet meals for him. (IDEAS ARE FOOD) 
Unrelated target sentence: They are exotic tropical plants for him. (IDEAS ARE PLANTS)” (Thibodeau & Durgin 
2008: 537). 
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4.2. The experimental complex evolving from Glucksberg, McGlone & Manfredi 
(1997)  
 4.2.1. The structure of the experimental complex 
 
This experimental complex consists of an original experiment, two non-exact replications, 
and a counter-experiment. See Figure 3. 
 
  NR1(C2003/1)  
 
OE (G1997/1) 
 
 NR2(C&K2006/1) COU (C&K2006/2) 
 
Figure 3. The structure of the experimental complex evolving from Glucksberg et al. (1997) 
 
There is a conflict not only between the original experiment and its non-exact replications, but 
also between the two non-exact replications; and further, between OE and the counter-
experiment COU. Thus, we have three limit-candidates: OE, NR1, and NR2.  
 
4.2.1. Re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Glucksberg et al. (1997) 
 
OE (cf. Section 2.2.1): The first task to be undertaken is the identification of the problematic 
points of the original experiment. 
 
Problem 1: Providing interpretations might require a reliance on a different representational 
system and skills than sentence processing. Thus, participants’ performance in 
finding and formulating an appropriate interpretation might be misleading when 
judging their processing behaviour.  
Problem 2: Irreversibility should mean that native speakers could not find the reversed 
version sensible in any context. Therefore, the inability to formulate a suitable 
interpretation or to find a sense of a reversed metaphor does not necessarily 
mean that in an appropriate context, participants could not understand the 
reversed metaphor.  
Problem 3: Although the fillers made it less likely that participants discovered the aim of the 
experiment, one cannot rule out that they made use of strategic considerations, 
and, for example, rejected reversed versions of conventional metaphors quickly 
because they perceived them as strange or unnatural, and did not seek possible 
contexts in which they could be meaningful. As a consequence, it is questionable 
whether the experiment is capable of eliciting peoples’ natural linguistic 
behaviour.  
Problem 4: The same people coded the original order sentences and classified the reversed 
versions. As the authors also remark, “the judges could not be blind to 
experimental condition” (Glucksberg et al. 1997: 55).  
Problem 5: The analysis and coding of the paraphrases have not been made public, although 
this would be vital in the evaluation of the experiment. 
Problem 6: A further concern pertains to the statistical analysis of the perceptual data, 
because the experimental report does not contain the whole set of the 
experimental data, and there seem to be errors in the values provided.  
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Problem 7: It is debatable whether the results are capable of differentiating among rival 
approaches to metaphor processing. For instance, Glucksberg’s Attributive 
Categorisation View and Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory both assign 
different roles to the topic and vehicle; therefore, both of them seem to be in 
harmony with the results and the research hypothesis. 
 
4.2.2. Re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Chiappe, Kennedy & Smykowsky (2003) 
 
NR1 (cf. Section 2.2.2): The progressivity of this non-exact replication is due to three factors: 
the extension of the set of metaphors in the stimulus material, suggesting a more elaborated 
research hypothesis (and providing a partial solution to Problem 7), as well as the solution of 
Problem 4 by applying independent scorers blind to the aim and structure of the experiment. 
Problems 1, 2, 3, and 5, in contrast, remained open, and also new problems emerged: 
 
Problem 8: The reduction of the stimulus material to idiomatic expressions is a potential 
error source, because the aim of the experiment is less masked. 
Problem 9: The number of items in a task sheet was very high. This might have led to 
boredom effects or to the use of conscious strategic considerations.  
Problem 10: NR1 seems to make use of rather novel metaphors, while OE contained both 
conventional and novel metaphors. Thus, the role of conventionality is not 
reflected upon. 
 
4.2.3. Re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Campbell & Katz (2006) 
 
NR2 (cf. Section 2.2.3): This non-exact replication is clearly progressive, because at several 
points the experimental design was re-thought and modifications were made, such as the 
addition of the contextually embedded versions and the refinement of the coding system. 
Thus, NR2 provides at least a partial solution to Problems 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10. The author’s 
attempt to resolve Problems 2 and 3, however, has also lead to a new problem: 
 
Problem 11: The significant differences between the with-context and without context 
conditions question the usability of the latter, and prompt a clarification of the 
role of the context. 
 
COU: Experiment 2 is a counter-experiment to OE because it is intended to provide evidence 
against the thesis of the irreversibility of metaphors by applying a similar stimulus material 
(i.e., an extended set) but using a different method. It offers a solution to a wide range of 
problems pertaining to OE. Thus, due to the application of a different method, Problems 1-5 
did not emerge in this case, but two new problems came up: 
 
Problem 12: Since participants had to press a button after reading each word, this might have 
distorted their normal reading habits.  
Problem 13: The negative outcome of the experiment (no reliable differences were found) 
motivates a control experiment in order to check whether this method is 
sensitive enough to detect relevant differences. 
 
4.2.4. Comparison of the problem solving processes 
 
Table 3 shows the emergence and solution of problems in this experimental complex. 
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 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
OE E E E E E E E       
NR1 O O O S O  P E E E    
NR2 O P P S P  O S  S E   
COU S S S    O     E E 
 
Table 3. Overview of the re-evaluation of the experimental complex evolving from Glucksberg et al. (1997) 
 
Since the original experiment, as well as its non-exact replications are burdened with several 
problems, none of them can be regarded as a limit of this experimental complex. Thus, 
forcing a decision would be untimely. A further important upshot of our analyses is that the 
number and variety of problems related to the four experiments make the continuation of this 
line of research quite prospective and reasonable. The elaboration of newer versions seems to 
be possible, and more refined designs give good grounds for expecting more plausible 
experimental data.    
 
4.2.5. Determination of the direction of the continuation of the cyclic process of re-
evaluation 
 
Since NR2 proved to be the most refined version of the original experiment, the most 
promising decision might be to improve it further, i.e., to use the Contrastive Strategy. The 
following points should receive special emphasis during the elaboration of a new non-exact 
replication:  
 
– Conventionality should be taken into consideration as a potentially relevant factor during 
the elaboration of the experimental design. 
– The task should be formulated in such a way that the difference between those metaphors 
which are strange or unfamiliar but conceivable in special contexts, and those that are 
incomprehensible in every situation, is made clear. By the same token, context-free and 
contextually embedded versions should be applied as well. 
– Adding an online version of the experiment (similar to COU) and relying on the results of 
a pair of different experiments seems to be well-motivated. 
– Predictions should be formulated in such a way that they can be squarely confronted with 
different approaches to metaphor processing.  
 
 
4.3. The experimental complex evolving from Bowdle & Gentner (2005) 
4.3.1. The structure of the experimental complex 
 
This experimental complex involves an original experiment and a related control experiment, 
as well as two non-exact replications of the original experiment and a non-exact replication of 
the control experiment. Experiment 3 by Jones and Estes is not included because it belongs to 
another experimental complex. That is, it is neither the non-exact replication of NR2 or CON2, 
nor a counter- or control experiment to any of the experiments. See Figure 4. 
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OE (B&G2005/1)  CON1(B&G2005/2) 
 
 
 
NR1 (B&G20005/3)  
 
 
 
 
 
NR2 (J&E2006/1) CON2(J&E2006/2) 
 
Figure 4. The structure of the experimental complex evolving from Bowdle & Gentner (2005) 
 
In this case, there are two limit-candidates: NR1 and NR2. 
 
4.3.2. Re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Bowdle & Gentner (2005) 
 
OE (cf. Section 2.3.1): Regarding the identification of the problematic points of the original 
experiment, the following list can be compiled: 
 
Problem 1: The number of participants was very low, since there were only 16 subjects.  
Problem 2: In the pre-tests, a small group of subjects had to evaluate the conventionality and 
abstractness of a huge number of items, i.e. 100 figurative statements.  
Problem 3: The high number of items and the invariance in the task might have led to 
unnatural linguistic behaviour and the use of conscious strategies. 
Problem 4: Neither the stimulus material nor the results of the pre-tests can be found in the 
experimental report.  
Problem 5: Grammatical form preferences do not necessarily mirror processing differences. 
It might be the case that conventional figuratives are preferred as metaphors, due 
to the higher frequency and familiarity of these forms. 
Problem 6: There was an unpredicted interaction between conventionality and concreteness. 
Thus, the research hypothesis and the predictions seem to be incomplete because 
they leave the role of concreteness/abstractness unclarified. 
 
CON1 (cf. Section 2.3.1): Experiment 2 in Bowdle & Gentner (2005) is a control experiment. 
Although it provides a solution to Problem 5 by the application of an online method, it also 
raises new problems: 
 
Problem 7: Since participants knew they had to provide an interpretation, response times 
might have been not pure comprehension times but might have been lengthened 
if a participant had already tried to formulate an interpretation. Therefore, the 
ease of formulation of an interpretation might have influenced the 
comprehension times.  
Problem 8: The role of aptness, as raised, for example, in Chiappe & Kennedy (2003) and 
Jones & Estes (2005), was only investigated in a (very thorough) post-hoc test. 
 
NR1 (cf. Section 2.3.1): Experiment 3 in Bowdle & Gentner (2005) is a non-exact replication 
of Experiment 1. Its progressivity is due to the involvement of further elements of the theory 
into the tested hypothesis and experimental design. Problem 1 was solved by recruiting a 
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higher number of participants, but Problems 2-5 emerge in this case, again. There were two 
further problems, as well:   
 
Problem 9: The key point with this experiment is, whether there is a strong enough analogy 
between this “in vitro” conventionalisation and “real” conventionalisation. It 
might be the case that the task in the first phase of the experiment utilizes short 
time memory and the resulting data provide information about this rather than 
about the mental representation of language.  
Problem 10: Problem 3 has become more serious due to the high number of items both in the 
study phase (32 triads) and in the test phase (48 figuratives). 
 
 
4.3.3. Re-evaluation of the limit-candidate by Jones & Estes (2006) 
 
NR2 (cf. Section 2.3.2): Experiment 1 by Jones & Estes (2006) is a progressive non-exact 
replication of OE due to the addition of a new, potentially relevant factor (aptness) to the 
tested hypothesis, as well as the solution of Problems 1, 4 and 8, and a partial solution to 
Problem 2. Two new problems have arisen: 
 
Problem 11: Although there was a significant difference between the ratings of the 
conventional and novel vehicles (M = 5.14 vs. M = 3.42) in the pre-test, and 
similarly, the high-apt items were scored as significantly more apt than low-apt 
items (M = 4.85 vs. M = 3.09), the choice of the stimulus material can be 
questioned. Namely, the conventionality ratings made up a continuous set of 
numbers, which means that several experimental sentences had average 
conventionality. This could have been avoided if the authors had chosen 
metaphors with ratings from the highest third and the lowest third of the values. 
The aptness ratings raise a similar problem: as the list in the Appendix of Jones 
& Estes (2006) reveals, there were pairs which were not high-low dyads, but 
rather low-low (2.76-1.90, 2.64-1.79) or high-high pairs (6.48-5.69, 5.52-4.79). 
Problem 12: Metaphor form preference was 3.57 and 3.27 for high apt items and for low apt 
items, respectively. Both values are rather inconclusive, being close to the scalar 
midpoint. 
Problem 13: In only two cases were the results significant in the participant analysis. 
Problem 14: There was a marginally significant interaction between aptness and 
conventionality (but only by participants, again). 
 
CON2 (cf. Section 2.3.2): Experiment 2 was a control experiment for NE2, and, at the same 
time, a non-exact replication of CON1 by Bowdle & Gentner (2005). Its progressivity is 
mainly due to the same factors as was the case with NR2. Nonetheless, it also inherited 
problems from CON1 and NR2, and a new problem emerged, too: 
 
Problem 15: A main effect of conventionality was found, although it was significant only in 
the participant analysis. More specifically, conventional similes were 
comprehended quicker than novel similes. This result provides weak partial 
support to Gentner’s theory. 
 
Table 4 visualises the problem solving process in this experimental complex. 
 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
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OE E E E E E E          
CON1 O  O O S  E E        
NR1 S O O O O    E E      
NR2 S P O S O   S   E E E E  
CON2 S P O S S  O S   O    E 
 
Table 4. Overview of the re-evaluation of the experimental complex evolving from Bowdle & Gentner (2005) 
 
 
4.3.4. Comparison of the problem solving processes 
 
As Table 4’s visualisation of the upshot of the re-evaluation process we conducted in 
Subsections 4.3.1-3 shows, both limit-candidates are burdened with problems. Thus, although 
the pair NR2 and CON2 provides more plausible experimental data, similarly to the other two 
experimental complexes, no well-founded decision can be made regarding the conflict 
between the two series of experiments. This motivates again the extension of this 
experimental complex with more refined versions of the experiments and control experiments. 
 
 
4.3.5. Determination of the direction of the continuation of the cyclic process of re-
evaluation 
 
Despite the ineffectiveness of the problem solving process, the two chains of experiments 
provide us valuable starting points for starting a new cycle of non-exact replications. Namely, 
Problems 6, 8, 14 and 15 motivate the application of the Combinative Strategy in order to 
reveal the role of the three potentially relevant factors: concreteness, conventionality, and 
aptness.  
 
 
5. Summary 
 
In Section 1, we raised the following paradox in relation to psycholinguistic experiments: 
 
(P) Replications are  
(a) effective tools of problem solving because they lead to more plausible 
experimental results; and they are also 
(b) ineffective tools of problem solving because they trigger cumulative contradictions 
among different replications of an experiment. 
 
On the basis of our considerations in Section 3, as well as the case studies presented in 
Section 4, the following solution to (P) presents itself: 
(S) Non-exact replications  
(a) are effective tools of problem solving if  
– they are progressive,  
– a limit of the experimental complex can be reached (temporarily, and 
relative to the informational state), and  
– the experimental complex has only one limit, or conflicts with other limits 
can be resolved; 
(b) are ineffective tools of problem solving if  
– they are not progressive, or 
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– the chain of non-exact replications is not capable of reaching a limit of the 
experimental complex, or 
– conflicts among different limits of the same experimental complex cannot 
be resolved; 
(c) provide us valuable starting points for the elaboration of new, more refined non-
exact replications which might lead to a limit of the experimental complex; 
(d) guide the choice and application of the problem solving strategies. 
 
As (S) shows, while progressivity is a local characteristic of non-exact replications, 
effectiveness is a global feature. This means that progressivity is relative to an experiment 
and its non-exact replication, while effectiveness can be judged only relative to an 
experimental complex. Nonetheless, there are still two caveats. First, new pieces of 
information can overrule earlier decisions. Thus, a non-exact replication can turn out to be 
problematic and lose its limit-status. From this it follows that effectiveness can be judged only 
in the long run, and decisions are not final but only provisional. Second, a limit of an 
experimental complex may be inconsistent with a limit of another experimental complex. 
Therefore, besides intra-complex relations, inter-complex relations have to be reconstructed 
and evaluated.  
To sum up, the proposed model supposes that experiments and experimental complexes 
alike are open processes in the sense that, in possession of new pieces of information, they 
may be continued, modified, or even discarded. Therefore, there are no experiments whose 
results were unquestionable (both practically and theoretically), nor immune to any 
improvement, refinement, or criticism. A second key feature of the proposed model is that 
experimental complexes are supposed to be not linear but cyclic. This means that a given step 
of the re-evaluation process does not necessarily lead to better results.23 It may turn back to 
earlier stages and continue the revisions with an experiment for which a non-exact replication 
has already been conducted. Thirdly, conflicts among experiments cannot be resolved in a 
simple way, for example, by a mechanical comparison of the plausibility of their results. 
Instead, strategies of inconsistency resolution as described in Section 3.2 have to be applied. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
Literature 
Arabatzis, T. (2008): Experiment. In: Psillos, S., Curd, M. (Eds.), The Routledge companion 
to philosophy of science. Routledge, London & New York, 159-170. 
Bowdle, B.F. & Gentner, D. (2005): The career of metaphor. Psychological Review 112 (1), 
193-216. 
Campbell, J.D. & Katz, A.N. (2006): On reversing the topics and vehicles of metaphors. 
Metaphor and Symbol 21(1), 1-22. 
Chiappe, D., Kennedy, J.M. & Smykowski, T. (2003): Reversibility, aptness, and the 
conventionality of metaphors and similes. Metaphor and Symbol 18(2), 85-105. 
Collins, H.M. (1985): Changing order: Replication and induction in scientific practice. Sage, 
Beverly Hills & London. 
                                                 
23 This motivated the distinction between the progressivity and effectiveness of non-exact replications in Section 
3.1. 
 22 
Franklin, A. (2002): Selectivity and discord. Two problems of experiment. University of 
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
Gentner, D., & Boronat, C. B. (1992). Metaphor as mapping. Paper presented at the 
Workshop on Metaphor, Tel Aviv, 1992. 
Glucksberg, S., McGlone, M.S. & Manfredi, D. (1997): Property attribution in metaphor 
comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language 36, 50-67. 
Haberlandt, K. (1994): Methods in reading research. In: Gernsbacher, M.A. (ed.): Handbook 
of psycholinguistics. Madison, Wisconsin: Academic Press, 1-31. 
Hasson, U. & Giora, R. (2007): Experimental methods for studying the mental representation 
of language. In: Gonzalez-Marquez, M., Mittelberg, I., Coulson, S. & Spivey, M. J. 
(eds.): Methods in Cognitive Linguistics. Benjamins, 304-324. 
Jones, L.L. & Estes, Z. (2005): Metaphor comprehension as attributive categorization. 
Journal of Memory and Language 53, 110-124. 
Jones, L.L. & Estes, Z. (2006): Roosters, robins, and alarm clocks: Aptness and 
conventionality in metaphor comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language 55, 18-
32. 
Kaiser, E. (2013): Experimental paradigms in psycholinguistics. In: Podesva, R.J. & Sharma, 
D. (eds.): Research Methods in Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
135-168. 
Keenan, J.M., Potts, G.R., Golding, J.M. & Jennings, T.M. (1990): Which elaborative 
inferences are drawn during reading? A question of methodologies. In: Balota, D.A., 
Flores d’ Archais, G.B. & Rayner, K. (eds.): Comprehension processes in reading. 
Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 377-402. 
Kertész, A. & Rákosi, Cs. (2012): Data and Evidence in Linguistics: A Plausible 
Argumentation Model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kertész, A. & Rákosi, Cs. (2014): The p-model of data and evidence in linguistics. In: 
Kertész, A. & Rákosi, Cs. (eds.): The Evidential Basis of Linguistic Argumentation. 
Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 15-48. 
Keysar, B., Shen, Y., Glucksberg, S., Horton, W.S., 2000. Conventional language: How 
metaphorical is it? Journal of Memory and Language 43, 576-593. 
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980): Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Machamer, P. (2002): A brief historical introduction to the philosophy of science. In: 
Machamer, P. & Silberstein, M. (eds.): The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science. 
Blackwell, Malden & Oxford, 1-17. 
Pickering, A. (1981): The hunting of the quark. Isis 72, 216-236. 
Rákosi, Cs. (2012): The fabulous engine: strengths and flaws of psycholinguistic experiments. 
Language Sciences 34, 682-701. 
Rákosi, Cs. (2014): On the rhetoricity of psycholinguistic experiments. Argumentum 10, 533-
547. http://argumentum.unideb.hu/2014-anyagok/angol_kotet/rakosicsi.pdf. 
Thibodeau, P. & Durgin, F.H. (2008): Productive figurative communication: Conventional 
metaphors facilitate the comprehension of related novel metaphors. Journal of Memory 
and Language 58, 521-540. 
